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INTRODUCTION
Every day, immigration judges (IJ) make decisions to grant or deny noncitizens relief from removal. A removal hearing1 can have serious
consequences for the respondent. Removal can separate families and deprive
people of “all that makes life worth living.” 2 It can also serve as a death
sentence for those escaping persecution or a fearing of persecution in their
country of origin.3 For these reasons, among others, it is critical that removal
hearings be conducted by impartial and independent adjudicators. However,

*J.D. Candidate 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Master of Social
Work, 2017 University of Southern California. I would like to thank Professor Richard Boswell and
Professor Dave Owen for their feedback, support, and guidance during the writing and editing
process. I dedicate this article to my parents and husband who over the years have shared their
experiences with immigrating to the United States, fueling my interest in immigration law.
1. Removal hearings are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Although
removal is the current term used to describe these proceedings, they were previously referred to as
deportation hearings. In 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996 revised procedures, combining deportation proceedings and exclusion
proceedings (used to determine whether a non-citizen can be admitted to the United States) into a
single proceeding called a removal proceeding. The term removal now replaces the term deportation
and exclusion. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229(a); see generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.12 et seq.,
1240.1 et seq. In this paper, both deportation and removal will be used to describe the legal
procedure by which non-citizens are removed from the United States.
2. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (describing the risk for respondent in
deportation proceedings); see also Will Maslow, Recasting our Deportation Law: Proposals for
Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310 (1956) (describing deportation as “tearing” a non-citizen
“physically” from their home, job, spouse, and children). Despite these consequences, the Court has
held that deportation, although “burdensome and severe,” “is not a punishment.” See Mahler v. Eby,
264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)); see also Bugajewitz
v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (stating deportation is not a punishment, “it is simply a refusal
by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want.”).
3. Many of those seeking admission to the United States are applying for asylum relief.
Asylum relief is a discretionary form of relief provided to persons within the United States who
show they are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (defining “refugee”); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1158 (providing that an applicant must establish persecution based on one of the five protected
classes: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion);
see also, Joel Rose & Marisa Peñaloza, Denied Asylum, But Terrified To Return Home, NPR (July
20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630877498/denied-asylum-but-terrified-to-returnhome (describing the story of one asylum seeker escaping gang violence in Honduras). Yet not all
who apply for asylum and meet the definition of refugee are entitled to asylum. See I.N.S. v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 430 n.18 (1984) (providing that “[m]eeting the definition of ‘refugee,’ however, does
not entitle the alien to asylum—the decision to grant a particular application rests in the discretion
of the Attorney General” under 8 U.S.C. § 208(a)).
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judicial impartiality and independence are undermined4 when there is
prosecutorial control5 of adjudicators.6 This paper will show how
prosecutorial control continues to permeate the United States Immigration
Court system, threatens judicial independence and impartiality in
immigration cases, and undermines justice through the perception—real or
not —that adjudicators are not independent. It will also discuss the role of the
United States Constitution’s Appointments Clause and how the current
method of IJ appointment contributes to prosecutorial control.7
Concerns regarding prosecutorial control of adjudicatory functions is
not new, and in 1946 the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was enacted,
in part, to address these concerns.8 Yet, in the Supplemental Appropriation
Act of 1951 Congress determined the APA does not apply to removal
proceedings.9 This was reinforced by the Court’s ruling in Marcello v.
Bonds,10 where the Court not only found the APA inapplicable to deportation

4. “Judicial Independence means that judges are not subject to external pressure and influence
and are free to make impartial decisions based solely on fact and law.” For the Rule of Law, An
Independent Immigration Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2022) (statement of Karen T. Grisez, Former Chair,
American Bar Association). Throughout this paper the term “judicial” will be used in reference to
immigration judges and their adjudicatory function within EOIR.
5. Throughout this paper, “prosecutorial control” will be used to describe control by the
Attorney General and the law enforcement functions of the Executive Branch.
6. See Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish. An
Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 16 (2008), https://www.naijusa.org/images/uploads/publications/Urgent-Priority_1-1-08_1.pdf (describing the need to create
an independent Article I Court to separate the Immigration Court from law enforcement); see also
Harry N. Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 172 (1958) (discussing how an IJ who is appointed and supervised
by a law enforcement official may not exercise full judicial independence); see also Courts in Crisis:
The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2020)
(statement of Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, National Association of Immigration Judges)
(discussing the structural flaws and politization of the United States Immigration Court System).
7. The Appointments Clause designates the procedures by which officers, such as IJs, are
appointed. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237; 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; see also Sidney B. Rawitz, From
Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453, 456 (1988) (explaining that prior
to the APA’s enactment there was a “strong demand” for reform of agency hearing procedures).
9. Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, 64 Stat.1048 (establishing the APA does not
apply to deportation proceedings). Through this act Congress amended the law after the Supreme
Court’s holding in Sung v. McGrath. See Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 35, 41 (1950) (superseded
by statute).
10. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311, 315 (1955). Petitioner was a native of Tunis, Africa
who was lawfully brought to the United States when he was eight months old and resided there
since. He was married to an American citizen and had four American citizen children. He was
convicted of a violation of the Marihuana Tax Act and sentenced to one year imprisonment. The
conviction was grounds for deportation and his case was heard before a Special Inquiry Officer of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) who was under the control and supervision of an
official who participated in investigative and prosecutorial functions. In a writ of habeas corpus,
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proceedings, but also found that supervision and control of immigration
adjudicators by prosecuting and investigating officials does not call into
question the fairness and impartiality of a hearing or violate the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.11
At the time of the Marcello ruling, IJs were supervised by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which performed
prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions.12 Today, although
IJs are no longer part of the INS, they remain under the control of the
Attorney General, the country’s chief prosecutor, within the Department of
Justice (DOJ).13
Part I of this paper will provide background on IJs, their role within the
immigration court system, and the current state of prosecutorial control
within immigration courts. Part II will analyze whether the current method
of IJ appointment is constitutional under the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution.14 It will also discuss the importance of the Appointments Clause
and its role in Separation of Powers.15 Part III will propose a new appointment
scheme which is not only constitutional, but also considers the Separation of
Powers principle16 embedded in the Constitution.

petitioner challenged the validity of the deportation order because the hearing did not comply with
the APA and violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id.
11. Id. at 311 (finding a Special Inquiry Officer who is subject to the supervision and control
of officials with investigative and prosecuting functions does not strip a proceeding of “fairness and
impartiality as to make [it] violative of due process.”). But see U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due Process
Clause) (stating no person “ shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.”); see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (stating “the fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”)
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972) (describing due process as a “flexible” standard which “calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”) (internal quotation omitted).
12. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. at 311; see Rawitz, supra note 8, at 458.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 503 (establishing the Attorney General as the head of the Department of
Justice);
see
also
Organizational
Chart,
U.S.
DEP’T OF
JUST.
(2018),
https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart [hereinafter DOJ Organizational Chart] (providing an
illustration of all the agencies within the DOJ, including the Executive Office for Immigration
Review which houses IJs). This change was made, in part, to protect IJs from having the same
supervisors as INS prosecutors under the INS. See Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 3.
14. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see
generally Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868 (1991); see generally Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651
(1997); see generally Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); see generally U.S. v. Arthrex, 141 S.
Ct. 1970 (2021).
15. The Appointments Clause has Separation of Powers principles built into it. Its purpose is
not only to designate the procedure that principal and inferior officers are appointed by, but also to
ensure a separation of power among the three branches of government. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at
660; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 685 (describing how Separation of Powers is “woven into” the
Constitution).
16. The purpose of this principle is to prevent the comingling of judicial, executive, and
legislative functions. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 159 (using Montesquieu’s “well known maxim” to
discuss the purpose of Separation of Powers within the United States Constitution).
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PART I: BACKGROUND
A. History of IJs and Their Role Within the Immigration Court
System
Although today it may seem inconceivable, people at risk of deportation
did not always have a right to a hearing before an IJ. Prior to 1952, the statute
governing deportation, the Immigration Act of 1917, did not explicitly
require a deportation hearing, allowing non-citizens to be taken into custody
and deported at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor.17 This was despite
the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamataya v. Fisher, also known as The
Japanese Immigrant Case, which determined that immigrants, even those
who entered the United States illegally, could not be deported without an
opportunity to be heard as required by the Due Process Clause. 18
Early deportation hearings were conducted by an “immigrant inspector”
who held various roles, including the investigation of cases involving
deportable non-citizens.19 Although an immigrant inspector who had
participated in the investigation phase of a case was not allowed to preside
over the hearing, the early model of immigration adjudication effectively
allowed the “presiding inspector” to participate in both adjudicatory and
prosecutorial functions.20 Respondents were allowed to have counsel present,
17. See Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 889. Until 1933 immigration services were
housed within the Department of Labor and the Immigration Act of 1917 allowed for deportation at
the discretion of the Secretary of Labor. Id. See also Overview of INS History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERV.
5 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/factsheets/INSHistory.pdf. In 1952, Congress finally provided procedural requirements for deportation
hearings, which contained the minimum required due process requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1995); see also 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.04
(Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., rev. ed. 2022) (stating the statute contains the minimum
requirement for due process).
18. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). The petitioner, Yamataya, was a nonEnglish speaking Japanese immigrant who was found to be a public charge and ordered deported.
The Court found due process had been satisfied because Yamataya had notice that an investigation
about her immigration status was underway and she also had the opportunity to deny the claims
made against her and answer questions before the immigration officer. This finding came despite
Yamataya being unable to speak English, understand the nature or importance of the questions she
was asked, or know that she could be deported. The Court reasoned these concerns were not for the
Court to address, but rather was an issue for the immigration officers handling her case. Id at 10102. This case also created a distinction between those at the border seeking admission and noncitizens within the United States, guaranteeing due process rights only to those already within the
United States. See id. at 100; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“it is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation
proceedings.”).
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (providing an IJ conducts deportation proceedings). An IJ was
formerly known as an immigrant inspector. See Rawitz, supra note 8, at 454 (describing the various
roles held by immigrant inspectors).
20. See Rawitz, supra note 8, at 455 (“the presiding inspector combined functions of a
prosecutor and judge and at each level the entire file, regardless of the contaminating nature of its
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but they were not entitled to have an attorney provided for them. This remains
the case today.21
In 1946, the APA was enacted to help ensure independence and
impartiality by administrative adjudicators and to invalidate the practice of
“embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge.”22
The court later reinforced the APA’s application to deportation proceedings
in Sung v. McGrath.23 There, the Court addressed the need for impartial
adjudication that was separate from investigative and prosecutorial functions
and found the APA applied to deportation proceedings.24
However, the APA’s protections were short lived. In the 1951
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress stated that exclusion and
expulsion were not governed by Sections 5, 7, and 8 25 of the APA.26 The
Supreme Court later reinforced this principle in Marcello v. Bonds, stating

contents, was in the hands of the reviewing authority”). There, Rawitz describes how presiding
inspectors “extracted testimony” and “interrogated” non-citizens, reviewed the non-citizen’s entire
file including “hearsay, ‘spite’ letters, classified information, or other prejudicial material.” Id.
21. Gideon v. Wainwright held the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel (in criminal cases)
was made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, a defendant who could not
afford an attorney was entitled to have counsel appointed for them. 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). But
because immigration law is considered civil and not criminal law, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel does not apply. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, (“[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy… assistance of counsel for his defense.”); see also Fong, 149 U.S. at 730 (“the order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime.”). However, in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California found that immigrant detainees with
mental disabilities are entitled to the reasonable accommodation of a qualified representative to
assist them in removal and detention proceedings under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 2013
WL 3674492 at 3 (not reported in F. Supp. 2d). See also Franco Gonzalez v. Holder, ACLU (Apr.
24, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/cases/franco-gonzalez-v-holder (explaining that Mr. FrancoGonzalez filed suit after being detained for almost five years without a hearing or a lawyer). For
additional information on the importance of counsel in deportation proceedings, see generally The
Right
to
Counsel,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/right_to_counsel_final.pdf (last visited
Jan. 20, 2022); see also Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AM. IMMIGR. COUNS.,
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counsel-immigration-court
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2022).
22. See Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 35, 41 (1950) (superseded by statute); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d)(2) (providing that “an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate
or advise in the decision.”).
23. Sung, 339 U.S. at 35, 41. This case addressed a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a
native citizen of China who was charged with being in the United States unlawfully. It involved “a
single ultimate question − whether administrative hearings in deportation cases must conform to
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946.” Id.
24. Id.
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (pertaining to adjudications); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (pertaining
to judicial review); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-900 (pertaining to Congressional review of agency
rulemaking).
26. See Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, see also Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306 (finding
the APA does not apply to deportation proceedings).
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Congress had created an exemption to the APA in deportation proceedings
under section 242(b)27 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).28
From 1950 to 1952, officers adjudicating deportation hearings were
called hearing examiners.29 Then, in 1952 the INA designated them “special
inquiry officers” (SIOs).30 Finally, in 1973 SIOs were given the title of
immigration judges.31 In 1983 their positions were removed altogether from
the INS, becoming part of the newly created Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), under the DOJ.32 This change was made in part
due to “perceived and actual conflicts of interest” due to IJs and INS
prosecutors having the same supervisors under the former INS.33 This was
another attempt to protect the judicial independence of IJs, separating them
from INS law enforcement priorities.34 However, removing IJs from the
control of the INS, although well-reasoned, did not serve its intended
outcome, as IJs remain under the control of the DOJ—a law enforcement
agency—and the Attorney General, the nation’s chief prosecutor.35
B. DOJ Structure
The Attorney General is the head of the DOJ, which is the main law
enforcement agency in the United States.36 As the head of the DOJ, the
Attorney General has the power to appoint and supervise IJs.37 The Office of
the Attorney General’s mission is to “supervise and direct the administration
27. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310; see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 414, 66
Stat. 163, 209 (setting forth the procedure for proceedings before a special inquiry officer) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)).
28. Id. at 208-09 (providing the procedures for determining deportability by a special inquiry
officer); Marcello, 349 U.S. at 302. The Plenary Power Doctrine, which is a deferential standard
recognizing that “the power to expel or exclude aliens… [is] largely immune from judicial control,”
may also have played a role in the Court’s decision to exclude deportation from APA protections.
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953)). The Plenary Power Doctrine also includes the procedures by which to admit or exclude
non-citizens. “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned.” U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
29. See Rawitz, supra note 8, at 457 (discussing hearing examiners).
30. See 8 C.F.R. § 215.5 (pertaining to hearings before a Special Inquiry Officer).
31. See Rawitz, supra note 8, at 458 (stating that IJs were now also allowed to wear traditional
black judge’s robes); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (defining IJ).
32. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (a) (describing the organization of the EOIR). See also Evolution of the
U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-pre-1983 (describing the evolution of the immigration court
system).
33. See Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 3.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (“the Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice.”); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 501 (stating the DOJ is an executive department).
37. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (describing appointment of IJs by the Attorney General); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (pertaining to powers and duties of the Attorney General).
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and operation” of the DOJ, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, Bureau of Prisons, Office of Justice Programs, United States
Attorneys, and the United States Marshall Service, which are all housed
within the DOJ.38
Because the EOIR is housed within the DOJ, it is especially vulnerable
to “executive branch interference.”39 EOIR was created in 1983 and acts
under the delegated authority of the Attorney General to adjudicate
immigration cases.40 EOIR is comprised of five parts, three are relevant for
our purposes.41 First is the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, which
manages the immigration courts where removal proceedings are initially
heard.42 It “provides overall program direction and establishes priorities” for
more than 500 IJs in 66 immigration courts across the country.43 Second is
the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which primarily
adjudicates immigration-related employment cases.44 And third is the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is the highest-level administrative
body for immigration cases and conducts appellate review of IJ decisions. 45
38. Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and Associate,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-andfunctions-manual-attorneygeneral#:~:text=The%20mission%20of%20the%20Office,United%20States%20in%20legal%20m
atters. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-530(D) (pertaining to the Office of the Attorney General); see also §§
531-540(C) (pertaining to the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the DOJ); see also §§ 541-550
(pertaining to the United States Attorney within the DOJ); see also §§ 561-575 (pertaining to the
United States Marshall Service within the DOJ); see also §§ 599(A)-599(B) (pertaining to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives within the DOJ); see also DOJ
Organizational Chart, supra note 13.
39. See AILA and the American Immigration Council Obtain EOIR Hiring Plan via FOIA
litigation, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (May 5, 2020), https://www.aila.org/EOIRHiringPlan. See
also Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functionsmanual-executive-office-immigration-review [hereinafter Functions Manual EOIR] (describing
EOIR’s structure within the DOJ).
40. 6 U.S.C. § 521 (“there is in the Department of Justice the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, which shall be subject to the direction and regulation of the Attorney General…”); see also
Functions Manual EOIR, supra note 39.
41. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (“EOIR shall include the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Office
of the Chief Immigration Judge, the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, the Office
of Policy, the Office of the General Counsel, and such other components.”).
42. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.9(b).
43. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge.
44. See id; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a).
45. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 provides the BIA’s organization, jurisdiction and powers. The BIA has
appellate jurisdiction to review decisions in many different types of cases, including but not limited
to, removal and deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). The BIA does not conduct de novo review of
facts, using the findings of fact determined by IJs. But the board does complete de novo review in
questions of law. §1003.1(d)(3)(i), (ii). See also Functions Manual EOIR, supra note 39 (providing
the BIA conducts appellate review of IJ decisions).
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Under 8 U.S.C. § 1003.1(g)-(h), IJs apply the law provided to them by the
BIA and the Attorney General, and they conduct proceedings consistent with
8 U.S.C. § 1229a, enforcing the Code of Federal Regulations according to
precedent, statute, and regulations.46
In 2002, INS functions were transferred to the newly created
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).47 The former INS was moved out
of the DOJ to provide “EOIR with some degree of independence.”48 But
because EOIR was kept within the DOJ, this change did not create the level
of independence intended—the Attorney General remains the head of the
DOJ.49 Under this current structure, the IJs’ quasi-judicial role is diminished
because they are labeled DOJ attorneys, designated by the Attorney General
to conduct immigration proceedings under their direction and control.50 The
immigration court structure, as part of the DOJ, is sufficient alone to call into
question the perception of impartiality among immigration adjudications.51
This structure also gives way to the current method of IJ appointment by the
Attorney General.52

46. The BIA also sets precedent through the publication of selected decisions. 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(g)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a is the statute governing deportation proceedings.
47. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). See also 68
Fed. Reg. 9824 (2003) (describing the transfer of INS functions to DHS and its three parts: U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)).
48. See Marks, supra note 6, at 3.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 503; see also id. (stating the change did not create the desired level of
independence).
50. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (providing “immigration judges are attorneys whom the
Attorney General appoints…”).
51. Immigration adjudication has also come under scrutiny from several circuit courts. See
Fiadjoe v. Attorney General of U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 154-55 (3rd Cir. 2005) (describing the IJs
questioning of respondent as “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive.”); see also Reyes v. I.N.S., 342
F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the IJ departed from their neutral fact finding role by being
hostile towards respondent, judging his behavior as being “morally bankrupt.”); see also Huang v.
Gonzalez, 403 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating the IJ substituted their personal knowledge and
beliefs for the record in their decision). The treatment of non-citizens with mental disabilities in
deportation proceedings is also a concern. For example, in 2013, a Mexican immigrant with
cognitive disabilities, Jose Antonio Franco-Gonzalez, filed a lawsuit after being detained for almost
five years without a hearing or a lawyer. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, ACLU, supra note 21; see
also, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2013 WL 3674492 (not reported in F. Supp. 2d) (finding plaintiffs
are entitled to a reasonable accommodation of a qualified representative to assist them in removal
and detention proceedings under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
52. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (stating immigration judges are appointed by the Attorney
General).
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C. DOJ Policies
a. The DOJ is a Law Enforcement Agency with Law
Enforcement Priorities
The DOJ’s mission is “to enforce the law and defend the interests of the
United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats
foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and
controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful
behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all
Americans.”53 Although the DOJ lists the fair and impartial administration
of justice as one of its priorities, it is hard to imagine how this task can be
accomplished when the agency’s mission is to prosecute alleged “unlawful
behavior.” This combination of law enforcement and impartial adjudication
within one department or agency is antithetical because it undermines judicial
impartiality and independence.
Under the Bush Administration, immigration decisions came under
criticism by several federal circuit judges.54 In response, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan Cohn, made the DOJ’s law enforcement
priorities clear, defending the quality of IJ decisions by reasoning that
decisions could not be inadequate because the government had “prevailed in
91.5% of its immigration cases.”55 Under the Obama Administration,
Attorney General Eric Holder was criticized for tripling the rate of illegal
entry or re-entry deportations56 and in January 2014, the majority of

53. About DOJ, Our Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/about (emphasis added).
54. See Benslimane v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
“adjudication of [immigration cases] at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum
standards of legal justice.”) (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
Dawoud v. Gonzalez, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (“the IJs opinion is riddled with
inappropriate and extraneous comments.”); see also Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’
Handling
of
Asylum
Cases,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
26,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/26/us/courts-criticize-judges-handling-of-asylum-cases.html
(reporting on the criticism of IJs by circuit court judges).
55. See Concerning Immigration: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
3 (2006) (testimony of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice) (stating that the BIA’s reversal rate “in a single circuit court” should not be used as evidence
that judges are “doing an inadequate job of deciding cases.”); see also Liptak, supra note 54; see
also Benslimane v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 830 (providing cases in which several circuit courts
criticized IJ decisions).
56. See Homeland Security Department Oversight Hearing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(May 29, 2014), https://www.c-span.org/video/?319614-1/homeland-security-departmentoversight-hearing (discussing concerns about the “large number” of people who were being
deported for violations related to their undocumented status. “These are people who’ve lived [in the
United States] for years, some for decades…they have jobs and families, including U.S. citizen
spouses and children or… other close family who have legal status. Their only offense arises from
not being [in the United States] lawfully.”); see also Lynn Tramonte, Stop Prosecuting Immigrants,
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prosecutions were those arising under immigration law.57 This accounted for
52.3 percent of prosecutions, with prosecutions for “drugs-drug trafficking”
coming in second at 11.7 percent.58
More recently, in 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced
the DOJ’s immigration priorities under the Trump Administration. 59 He
framed immigration as a national security issue, effectively equating
immigration policies to the Department’s law enforcement policies. This
brought immigration within the domain of the Department’s mission to police
both citizens and non-citizens. Rather than recognizing immigration as a
distinct and separate area meriting impartial adjudication, immigration and
law enforcement were now formally intertwined.60 Referring to the changes,
Attorney General Sessions remarked,
“our immigration policies…do not promote our national interest, but
instead select a vast majority of legal immigrants without any respect to
merit… [law enforcement has] had to go into more dangerous situations and
confront more criminals—criminals who often shouldn’t be allowed in this
country in the first place.”61
Establishing perceived immigrants as criminals, Sessions’ message was
clear: sweeping immigration enforcement was a top DOJ priority under the
Trump Administration.

THE HILL (Apr. 15, 2014), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/203369-stoppersecuting-immigrants.
57. Prosecutions
for
January
2014,
TRAC
(Mar.
2014),
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/overall/monthlyjan14/fil/. Although the criminal and
immigration law systems are thought of as separate systems, they have a “collaborative
relationship.” Eagly, Ingrid V., Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. UNIV. L. REV., no. 4, 2010, 10
UCLA SCH. OF L. RSCH. PAPER 30, 1281, 1288. This allows “criminal prosecutors to take advantage
of the resources of the immigration system, which are largely unconstrained by the Constitution.
Detention without bond, interrogation without Miranda, arrest without probable cause of a crime,
and sentencing without probation all become available to the criminal prosecutor in varying degrees
as a result.” Id. An example of this can be seen in large scale prosecution of workers at a
meatpacking plant in Postville, IA. For complete analysis of how this case depicts the “collaborative
relationship” between the immigration and criminal law systems. See id. at 1301-03; see Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that during custodial interrogations a person “must
be warned [they] ha[ve] a right to remain silent, that any statement [they] make may be used as
evidence against [them], and that [they] have the right to the presence of an attorney, retained or
appointed.”).
58. TRAC, supra note 57.
59. See Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on National Security and Immigration
Priorities
of
Administration,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(Jan.
26,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-national-securityand-immigration-priorities.
60. See id. See also For the Rule of Law, An Independent Immigration Court: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 2 (2022)
(statement of Hon. Mimi Tsankov, President, National Association of Immigration Judges)
(explaining that the DOJ is a law enforcement agency which “prioritizes its law enforcement
functions at the expense of immigration courts.”).
61. See id.
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b. Enormous Caseloads and Case Completion Metrics
Infringe on IJ Independence
The enormous IJ caseload has come under scrutiny not only by the
media but also by the federal courts.62 Testimony at the 2006 Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing on Immigration Reform referred to immigration courts
as suffering from a “severe lack of resources and manpower at the IJ and BIA
levels.”63 At the time, there were 215 IJs, meaning that a single judge needed
to “dispose of 1,400 cases a year or nearly twenty-seven cases a week, or
more than five each business day, to simply stay abreast of his docket.”64 The
staggering number of cases raised an important question: whether IJs could
be “expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact and
conclusions of law.”65
In 2020, the backlog of cases reached almost 1.1 million.66 Citing this
backlog, the agency imposed performance requirements based on quotas and
deadlines, though little suggests these metrics accurately measure
performance.67 Under these metrics, judges are required to complete 700
cases per year, and no more than 15 percent of their cases can be remanded.68
The metrics appear arbitrary and there has been no explanation as to how they

62. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Hon.
John M. Walker, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). During the Bush Administration,
Attorney General Ashcroft implemented administrative policies modifying the structure and review
processes of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The number of judges on the BIA was cut
from 21 to 11 and cases were increasingly referred for single member review summary. De novo
review of an IJ’s factual findings was also eliminated and grounds for case dismissal were
broadened. By limiting opportunities for meaningful review by the BIA, the BIA backlog was
reduced, but not without consequence. The burden was simply shifted to the Federal Circuit Courts,
with caseloads rising from three percent to fifteen percent of the total caseload for many Courts of
Appeals.
63. See id. These concerns became even more apparent following the COVID-19 pandemic.
While state and federal courts across the country began quickly holding online hearings, it took
immigration courts seven months to allow “a handful of judges to conduct remote hearings.” The
immigration court’s software programs, printers, and computers were outdated and there were “too
few laptops that [were] capable of letting judges adjudicate cases while on telework. . .” While other
state and federal courts have moved to electronic filing and records, the immigration court continues
to operate with hardcopy files. Many immigration courts have inadequate space for storing files,
which forces staff to share cubicles and use workspaces that are “cramped,” “unhealthy” and
“unsafe.” See Hon. Mimi Tsankov, supra note 60, at 2-3.
64. See Hon. John M. Walker, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 4.
67. See id. (testifying that case completion metrics cannot accurately measure a judge’s
performance, because many factors such as the “complexity of a claim, the availability of evidence,
the involvement of counsel, and region-specific case law” all play a role in how promptly cases can
be decided).
68. See id. at 5; see also EOIR Performance Plan, Adjudicative Employees, EOIR (Mar. 30,
2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-memo-immigration-judge-performance-metrics (outlining
IJ performance metrics implemented on Oct. 1, 2018).
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were developed.69 This has raised concerns as to whether the metrics are a
pretext to interfere with judicial independence.70
These metrics also disproportionately impact the parties. Experienced
attorneys acting on behalf of the United States can easily prepare for trial on
a “shortened time frame” because they have handled “hundreds, if not
thousands of cases.”71 Respondents appearing in immigration court,
however, are often not represented by counsel, do not speak English, and
have limited knowledge of the law.72 When these factors are coupled with a
judge “who is penalized for slowing down to provide more guidance,”
respondents
are
not
only
on
an
unequal
“playing field” but at a severe disadvantage.73
In the past, a number of federal appellate courts have also criticized
immigration courts for poor decisions, reflecting a “pattern of biased and
incoherent decisions in asylum cases.”74 In those cases, the circuit judges
noted that “adjudication… had fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice,”75 and that there was a pattern of misconduct in which people were

69. Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 6.
70. See id. (“This benchmark clearly has no statistical value whatsoever, other than to give
management a pretext to interfere with the decisional independence of judges in the guise of
evaluating judges’ decisions… In the Court system, this is the job of appellate judges, not court
managers.”). In Las Americas v. Trump, an immigration advocacy group challenged, among other
things, the performance metrics and quotas imposed by the Trump Administration. This case is still
in its early stages, but as of July 2020 the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon has denied,
in part, a motion to dismiss the case. 475 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1200 (2020). In October of 2021, the
Biden Administration also announced suspension of the Trump-era performance metrics in an
internal memo to immigration judges. Priscilla Alvarez, Justice Department eliminated Trump-era
case
quotas
for
immigration
judges,
CNN
(Oct.
20,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/20/politics/immigration-judges-quotas/index.html.
71. Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 5.
72. Id. at 5.
73. See id. Judges who could not meet quotas were subject to negative performance reviews
which could result in termination. At the time more than 75% of IJs were on probation. In a hearing
before the U.S. House of Representatives, the President of the National Association of Immigration
Judges commented “we know it weighed heavily on [judges] as they made decisions on the bench
— should I grant a continuation and risk termination?” Hon. Mimi Tsankov, supra note 60, at 4.
74. Liptak, supra note 54; see Jonathan Cohn, supra note 55; see also Dawoud, 424 F.3d at
610 (stating the “IJs opinion is riddled with inappropriate and extraneous comments, such as
references to the IJ’s personal experiences with alcohol in Egypt, commentary on the state if the
tourism industry there, and speculation about the attractiveness of the United States to asylum
seekers in general.”); see also Ssali v. Gonzalez, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the IJ
and BIA made a “very significant mistake [that] suggests that the Board was not aware of the most
basic facts of Mr. Ssali’s case…”); see also Grupee v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir.
2005) (stating the IJ’s statement “is hard to take seriously.”); see also Wang v. Attorney General,
423 F.3d 260, 269 (3rd Cir. 2005) (stating “the tone tenor, the disparagement and sarcasm of the
[IJ] seem more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court proceeding.”); see also,
Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating the IJs findings were
“grounded solely on speculation and conjecture.”).
75. Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 828.
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sent back to countries where they would face persecution. 76 It is hard to
imagine how immigration adjudications could be improved by forcing judges
to hasten their decision-making process. Rather, it seems more likely that the
metrics imposed are a pretext to “incentivize” deportations,77 supporting the
notion that prosecutorial priorities are woven into our current immigration
court system.
c. DOJ’s Hiring Practices Are Politicized
The DOJ has also come under scrutiny for its politicized hiring of IJs.
This is especially concerning because while other administrative adjudicators
have the safeguards of the competitive examination process, IJ hiring does
not.78 Adopting merit-based appointment or hiring of IJs would require
agencies to consider relevant hiring criteria, helping to limit agency ability to
engage in “partisan hiring.”79
In the immigration court context, there have been concerns regarding
politicized hiring throughout various presidential administrations. During the
Bush Administration, the DOJ engaged in politicized hiring of immigration
judges in which a candidate’s “political leanings” were evaluated.80 During
interviews, candidates were asked about their voting record and their views

76. Liptak, supra note 54.
77. See Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 6 (“This program appears designed to mask
its true underlying purpose, which is to incentivize judges to issue more orders of deportation, faster,
at the risk of losing their jobs.”).
78. See Kent Barnett, Regulating Impartiality in Agency Adjudication, 69 DUKE L.J. 1695,
1702-3 (2020). Agency adjudications are divided into two categories. The first category of agency
adjudication is subject to the APA and is presided over by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
Until 2018, ALJs were subject to competitive examination process. The second category of
adjudications are presided over by non-ALJs whose proceedings are not all subject to the APA. IJs
are non-ALJs who are not hired through a competitive examination process and their proceedings
are not subject to the APA. See id; see also Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 10,
2018) (excepting ALJs from the competitive service).
79. See Barnett, supra note 78, at 1739 (explaining merit-based hiring helps ensure that the
only factors considered in hiring are those “germane to the judge’s ability to adjudicate fairly,
efficiently and competently.”). See also, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 380 (2007) (providing that IJ candidates “should
have to demonstrate [they] are sensitive to cultural differences and likely to treat all parties
respectfully; capable of managing a large docket without becoming impatient; predisposed to be
very careful in judging the credibility of people who claim to be victims of trauma or torture; and
able to produce well-reasoned decisions that take into account all of the evidence and arguments
presented by the parties.”).
80. Gabriel Pacyniak, Controversy Reemerges Over Hiring, Review of Immigration Judges,
22 Geo. IMMIGR. L.J. 805, 807 (2008); see also Office of Inspector Gen. & Office of Pro. Resp., An
Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office
of
the
Attorney
General,
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
103
(July
28,
2008),
https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter Politicized
Hiring by Monica Goodling] (detailing the methods of political screening used to hire IJs).
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on immigration and other social issues. 81 Further, EOIR was prohibited from
announcing IJ vacancies and candidates were solicited from the White
House, who in turn solicited candidates from groups affiliated with the
Republican party.82 Recommendations were then forwarded to EOIR. 83
By January 2020, three years into the Trump Administration, the DOJ
appointed 237 IJs, which is more than the Obama Administration appointed
in eight years.84 As a result, there were concerns over politicized hiring
practices, with one IJ applicant attributing withdrawal of a job offer by the
Trump Administration to her “political ideology.”85 Senate Democrats also
had similar concerns, warning that politicized hiring practices would not only
undermine the independence of immigration courts, but also cause “lasting
damage to public confidence in the immigration court system.”86
In May 2020, documents detailing changes the Trump Administration
made to the IJ hiring plan were brought to light. 87 Among the changes was a
shortening of the hiring timeline, presumably to allow for faster hiring of
politically desirable candidates.88 The shortened timeline raised concerns

81. Pacyniak, supra note 80, at 806-7; see also, Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling, supra
note 80, at 104 (stating candidates were asked who they voted for, their political affiliation, and
their views on the death penalty and abortion).
82. See Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling, supra note 80, at 102-3. The White House
solicited IJ candidates from the Republican National Lawyers Association, Republican National
Committeemen, state and local Republican Party officials, the Federalist Society, and prominent
Republicans. See also Pacyniak, supra note 80, at 806-807.
83. See Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling, supra note 80, at 104 (reporting candidates
were forwarded to EOIR after taking “political considerations into account.”).
84. Catherine Kim & Amy Semet, An Imperial Study of Political Control Over Immigration
Adjudication, 180 GEO. L.J. 579, 584 (2020).
85. See Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump Administration Blocked Her
over Politics, CNN (June 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judgeapplicant-says-trump-administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html.
86. See Sheldon Whitehouse et al., Letter to Hon. William P. Barr, U.S. SENATE 1 (Feb. 13,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-0213%20Ltr%20to%20AJ%20Barr%20re%20independence%20of%20immigration%20courts%20(
004).pdf (writing to express “deep” concern that “the Trump administration is undermining the
independence of immigration courts.”); see also Joel Rose, Senate Democrats Accuse Justice
Department
of
Politicizing
Immigration
Courts,
NPR
(Feb.
13,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805657208/senate-democrats-accuse-justice-department-ofpoliticizing-immigration-courts (providing news coverage regarding concerns of politicized IJ
hiring by the Trump administration).
87. See James McHenry III, Memorandum for Attorney General, AM. IMMIGRI. LAW. ASS’N
2-22 (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.aila.org/EOIRHiringPlan (detailing the new IJ and appellate IJ
hiring process).
88. See id. at 2 (shortening the time an IJ vacancy posting remains active and reducing the
time allotted for interviewing candidates). See also Tanvi Misra, DOJ Hiring Changes May Help
Trump’s
Plan
to
Curb
Immigration,
ROLL
CALL
(May
4,
2020),
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/05/04/doj-hiring-changes-may-help-trumps-plan-to-curbimmigration (describing concerns that the new IJ hiring system will favor political hiring).
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regarding the “rushing” of “preferred candidates” to create an “expedited,
predetermined, ideologically-based, insider hiring” process. 89
IJs hired under the Trump, Obama, and Bush administrations have also
come from similar backgrounds, typically coming from prior employment at
the former INS, DHS, or other offices within the DOJ.90 This matters, in part,
because there are great inconsistencies in the outcome of asylum cases,91
which are just one category of immigration court proceedings with the
potential for grave consequences—an incorrect ruling resulting in the denial
of a claim and forced removal could send someone back to their country of
origin to be tortured or killed.92 Some of the differences in adjudication
outcomes can be attributed to where a judge worked prior to becoming an
immigration judge.93 A study on factors affecting asylum outcomes found
that judges who had prior DHS or INS experience only granted asylum 38.9
percent of the time, while those who did not granted asylum claims 48.2
percent of the time.94 Judges who previously worked in a private firm, a nonprofit organization, or had experience in academia also granted asylum at
higher rates.95
Perhaps of even greater concern is the question of whether IJs impose
their own “philosophical attitude” or skepticism about an applicant’s
testimony to cases under their consideration.96 This question comes after the
“central finding” of a study that found deportation in asylum cases to be
“seriously influenced by the spin of a wheel” in that a clerk’s random
89. See Misra, supra note 88.
90. Kim & Semet, supra note 84, at 579. Many of the Biden Administration’s first seventeen
IJ hires, some of which were selected by the Trump Administration, are prosecutors and former ICE
attorneys. See EOIR Announces 17 New Immigration Judges, EOIR (May 6, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1392116/download. The Administration also appointed 24 IJs in
October 2021 and December 2021. See EOIR Announces 22 Immigration Judges, AM. IMMIGRI.
LAW. ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-announces-22-new-immigrationjudges; see also EOIR Announces 24 Immigration Judges, EOIR (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1444911/download.
91. See Amanda Frost, Deportation Without Disclosure: Immigration Court Needs
Transparency, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/deportation-without-disclosure-immigration-courts-need-transparency
(highlighting
disparities in asylum case outcomes by noting that some judges grant 60 percent of asylum cases
while others deny every case they hear).
92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (providing that
an applicant must establish persecution based on one of the five protected classes: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion); see also, Joel Rose &
Marisa Peñaloza, Denied Asylum, But Terrified To Return Home, NPR (July 20, 2018)
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630877498/denied-asylum-but-terrified-to-return-home
(describing the story of one asylum seeker escaping gang violence in Honduras).
93. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 79, at 346.
94. Id.
95. Id. (providing that judges having worked in nonprofits granted asylum at a rate of 55.4%;
judges who worked in private firms granted asylum at a rate of 46.3%; and judges who worked in
academia granted asylum at a rate of 52.3%).
96. See id. at 378.
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assignment of a case to one immigration judge over another influenced
whether asylum seekers could remain in the United States.97 These findings
provide support for the importance of a true merit-based hiring system, rather
than one which imposes partisan and political hiring. However, because the
Attorney General appoints IJs, it is unlikely that this can be achieved under
the current system.
D. Political Pressure and Presidential Control
Presidential administrations98 have also tried to influence immigration
decisions both directly and indirectly.99 In a 2018 news conference, President
Trump stated “[w]e have to have a real border, not judges….We don’t want
judges, we want security at the border.”100 This implies that judges are not
important and that case adjudication is not a priority; rather, the priority is
having a “real” border to keep immigrants out of the United States.101 On at
97. See id. (citing concerns that “an adjudicator’s deviation by more than 50% from the mean
rate for similar cases in that adjudicator’s own office raises serious questions about whether the
adjudicator is imposing his or her own philosophical attitude.”).
98. For purposes of this paper, presidential administrations will include both the President and
Attorney General. The Attorney General of the United States is chosen by the President and
appointed with advice and consent of the Senate. This means that the President specifically choses
an Attorney General who can carry out their duties in accordance with the President’s policy
initiatives.
99. IJs are subordinate to two executive branch officials. IJs are subordinate to the Attorney
General, who is subordinate to the President; this makes an IJ indirectly subordinate to the President.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (providing IJs are appointed by the Attorney General and “shall act as
the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 503
(providing that the President appoints the Attorney General through advice and consent of the
Senate); see For the Rule of Law, An Independent Immigration Court: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 4 (2022)
(statement of Elizabeth J. Stevens, Member, Federal Bar Association) (stating “political influence
means that [IJs] cannot ensure . . . decisions [are] made solely according to law.”).
100. See Breaking News Trump on Potential Judges: “Who Are These People?”, CNN
POLITICS,
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/06/19/donald-tump-immigration-judgesborder-security-sot.cnn (last visited May 16, 2022).
101. See Brett Samuels, Trump rejects calls for more immigration judges: “we have to have
a
real
border,
not
judges”,
THE
HILL
(June
19,
2018),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/393031-trump-rejects-calls-for-additionalimmigration-judges-we-have-to-have (“ultimately, we have to have a real border, not judges”). This
statement parallels the sentiments held by the Regan Administration in the 1980’s regarding Haitian
immigrants fleeing violence and persecution. In 1964 Haitian President Fracois Duvalier “declared
himself President-for-Life.” He controlled the country through “terror” until his son Jean-Claude
Duvalier took over. The Duvaliers had one the “Western Hemisphere’s worst human rights records.”
Jean-Claude Duvalier eventually left Haiti in 1986, leaving a “civilian, military junta,” the National
Council of Government, in control. See Carlos O. Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the
1980s and 1990s: Refugees, Immigration and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 673, n.5,
676, n.11 (1995). During this time, the United States saw an increase in Haitian migrants and entered
into an interdiction agreement with Haiti’s dictator, allowing the U.S. Coast Guard and former INS
to stop and search vessels traveling by sea and check the immigration status of the passengers. Those
without proper documentation were sent back to Haiti. “From 1981-1990, 22,940 Haitians were
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least two occasions, Attorney General Sessions used authority granted under
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) to refer cases to himself for review. 102 This led to
at least one IJ being removed from office, in one case for delaying the
deportation of a Guatemalan immigrant.103 On March 7, 2018 Attorney
General Sessions also reversed a ruling granting asylum to a Salvadorean
woman who had been physically and emotionally abused by her ex-husband
and told IJs that domestic abuse and gang violence were no longer sufficient
grounds for asylum.104 These statements and actions are especially
concerning given the results of a study detailing the effect a sitting president
can have on immigration adjudication.105 The study suggests that the
president in power at the time an IJ is appointed does not have influence over
removal rates, but the president in power at the time an immigration case is
adjudicated does.106 In other words, political pressure by those who supervise
IJs may also be a significant factor in removal rates.
Given the current state of the United States Immigration Court system,
it is especially important to ensure that IJs are appointed and supervised by
people who do not engage in prosecutorial functions. First and foremost, it is
important to ensure that IJ appointments adhere to constitutional
interdicted at sea. Of this number, INS considered 11 Haitians qualified to apply for asylum.” Ruth
Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 3 (Jan. 15, 2010),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21349.pdf.
102. See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018); see also, Matter of A-B,
28 I&N Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021).
103. See Matter of Castro-Tum, supra note 102, at 272. The case was decided by Attorney
General Sessions on May 17, 2018, through authority granted by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) after he
requested to review the case. The case involved a man who came to the United States as a 17-yearold unaccompanied minor. Id. See also, Jeff Gummage, Immigration Judges File Grievance Over
Justice Dept.’s Removal of Philly Jurist Who Delayed Man’s Deportation, THE PHILA. INQUIRER
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/immigration-judges-association-grievancephiladelphia-steven-morley-removal-deportation-case-20180808.html (stating when the judge on
the case tried to ensure the non-citizen had been “properly notified” to appear in court, a replacement
judge was sent to take over the proceedings ordering the non-citizen deported “without further
inquiry.” The DOJ also removed approximately 60 cases from the judge’s docket.).
104. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320-21 (A.G. 2018) (vacating the BIA’s decision
and remanding the case before an IJ); see also Jeff Gummage, Immigration judges accuse DOJ of
undermining a Philadelphia judge’s authority, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2018/08/08/Immigration-judges-accuse-DOJundermining-independence-authority-steven-morley-philadelphia/stories/201808080134.
In
Matter of A-B-, Attorney General Sessions also stated that Matter of A-R-C-G, which established
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular social
group, was incorrectly decided. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 346. Attorney General Garland has
since vacated Matter of A-B, directing IJs to follow previous precedent including Matter of A-R-CG. Matter of A-B, 28 I &N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021). See Matter of A-R-C-G, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA
204).
105. See Kim & Semet, supra note 84, at 622-23, 630.
106. Id. Explaining that IJ decisions “do not discernably differ based on which President
appointed them,” but IJs regardless of their appointment were more likely to order deportation
during the Trump administration. Although the study cannot confirm what the precise cause of this
is, the results suggest that IJs “decided cases differently during different presidential eras.” Id.
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requirements. Yet, it is equally important to ensure that the current method
of appointment guarantees hearings are being conducted by impartial
adjudicators because justice is undermined by even the perception, real or
not, that adjudicators are not impartial.107

PART II: THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND IJ
APPOINTMENT
A. The Appointments Clause: Are IJ Appointments by the
Attorney General Constitutional?
The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution designates the
procedures for appointing two different classes of officers.108 First, it
designates the procedures for appointing principal officers who are selected
by the President, with the advice and consent of the senate.109 Second, it
designates the procedures for appointing inferior officers who may be
appointed by either the President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of
Departments.110 IJs are appointed by the Attorney General of the United
States.111 If IJs are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause then their
appointment by the Attorney General is constitutional.112 This would mean
that the nation’s chief prosecutor, who is the head of the DOJ, and is
appointed by the President of the United States, can constitutionally appoint
IJs.113
To determine whether IJs are constitutionally appointed there are two
issues to resolve. First, whether IJs are officers (vs. employees114), and if so,
what type of officers they are (principal or inferior).115 Second, whether their
107. See Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 171 (“The fact that all of the quasi-judicial proceedings
are conducted by personnel who are subject to appointment by the Attorney General may raise some
doubt in the minds of respondents as to the complete impartiality of the hearings…”).
108. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating “…. and he shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the [S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such Inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”) (emphasis added).
109. See id.; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988).
110. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 2.
111. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (describing appointment of IJs by the Attorney General).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing the procedure for appointing inferior officers,
“Congress may vest the Appointment of …inferior officers… in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 503 (providing
that “[t]he Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice.”).
113. See id.
114. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (“For if that is true, the Appointments Clause cares not a
whit about who named them”). Explaining that non-officer employees are not appointed under the
Appointments Clause. See id.
115. See Edmond, 520. U.S. at 660-62.
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appointment by the Attorney General of the United States is constitutional.116
The Supreme Court has decided cases under the Appointments Clause, 117 but
it has not specifically addressed whether IJs are officers, what kind of officers
they are, or whether they are constitutionally appointed.118 However, the
Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue twice, in Hurtado v. Barr and Ramirez
v. Barr, yielding unpublished opinions in both cases.119
a. Officers Under the Appointments Clause
To determine whether someone is an officer of the United States, there
are two questions. First, does the appointee hold a continuing or permanent
office?120 Second, does the appointee exercise “significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States?”121 If an appointee holds continuing office
and exercises significant authority, they must be appointed in a manner
consistent with the Appointments Clause.122
Although the Court has not explicitly defined “significant authority,” it
has determined that the Tax Court’s Special Trial Judges (STJs) (in Freytag
v. Commissioner) and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) (in Lucia v. SEC) exercise significant
authority.123 In Freytag, the Court found that STJs exercise significant

116. See id.
117. For example, see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673 (discussing the appointment of Special
Inquiry Officer Alexia Morrison); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143 (addressing whether the
appointment of FEC members by the heads of the two houses of Congress was constitutional); see
also Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (addressing the appointment of the Tax Court’s special trial judges);
see also Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052 (addressing the appointment of the SEC’s administrative trial
judges; see also U.S. v Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1988 (2021) (addressing the appointment of
the Patent and Trademark Office’s administrative patent judges).
118. In Arthrex, the Court in dicta listed IJs as an example of inferior officers who are
appointed by heads of departments and are supervised by a principal officer who has discretion to
review their decisions. Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1984.
119. Hurtado v. Barr, 817 F. App’x 310, 313 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied (discussing whether
IJs are constitutionally appointed); see Ramirez v. Barr, 814 F. App’x 259, 265 (9th Cir. 2020)
(discussing whether IJs are constitutionally appointed).
120. States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879) (holding civil surgeons were not officers
because their duties were occasional or temporary instead of continuing or permanent.”); see also
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052 (citing Germaine).
121. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124, 126 (determining the line between an officer and non-officer is
the “exercis[e] of significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”).
122. See id.
123. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82 (finding the Tax Court’s STJ’s exercise significant
authority); see also Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052-56 (finding the SEC’s ALJs exercise significant
authority); see also id. at 2056 (J. Thomas, concurring) (“while precedents like Freytag discuss what
is sufficient to make someone an officer of the United States, our precedents have never really
described what is necessary”). In Arthrex the Court does not fully reach the issue of whether
administrative patent judges are officers. Instead, the Court notes the parties do not dispute the issue,
and the Court agrees they are officers because they exercise significant authority by issuing patent
decisions. 141 S. Ct. at 1980.
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authority because they take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the
admissibility of evidence, have the power to issue final decisions in at least
some cases, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery.124
More recently in Lucia, the court reaffirmed the principles described in
Freytag by comparing the SEC’s ALJs to the Tax Court’s STJs, stating that
they are “near carbon copies” of each other.125 In doing so, the majority stated
that SEC ALJs exercise significant authority because they take testimony,
conduct trials, rule on admissibility of evidence, and enforce discovery
orders.126
Regarding a judge’s power to enforce discovery orders, the Lucia Court
explicitly states it is not limited to holding parties in contempt or punishment
through fines.127 This elaborates on Freytag, which only required “the general
power to enforce compliance with discovery orders” and did not require “any
particular means of doing so.”128 The majority remarked that “a judge who
will, in the end, issue an opinion with factual findings, legal conclusions, and
sanctions has substantial informal power to ensure the parties stay in line.”129
This reinforces that the power to enforce discovery orders is broad, and most,
if not all, administrative judges wield it in some capacity.130 Therefore, under
the Appointment’s Clause, an Officer of the United States is someone who
holds a continuing or permanent position and exercises significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States.
b. Principal and Inferior Officers Under the Appointments
Clause
Determining if someone is an Officer of the United States is only the
threshold question. The next step is to determine what type of officer they
124. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. The Court explained that STJs were officers in part because
they had the authority to issue final decisions in at least some cases, specifically those arising under
26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3). Because STJs could issue final decisions in cases arising
under those sections, they were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. Id.
125. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052. There are two types of adjudicators that preside over agency
proceedings, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and non-ALJs adjudicators. Although the standard
in Lucia specifically focuses on SEC ALJs, it has implications for non-ALJ adjudicators, such as
immigration judges, who have similar power and authority to the ALJs at issue in Lucia. See Judge
Michael Devine, Judge Erin Wirth, ALJ Independence Under the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Lucia v. SEC, 58 JUDGES’ J. no. 2, 6, 8 (2019).
126. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053. The Court explains that in taking testimony, SEC ALJs examine
witnesses at hearings and take prehearing depositions. In conducting trials, they administer oaths,
rule on motions, determine the course of the hearing and the conduct of parties and counsel. They
also have the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, thus shaping the administrative record
and lastly, they have the power to enforce discovery orders. Id.
127. Id. at 2054. The STJs in Freytag had the power to punish through fines or imprisonment
but SEC ALJs had less power to sanction misconduct.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
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are. In Edmond v. United States, the Court examines the difference between
inferior and principal officers. There, the Court explains that being an inferior
officer “connotes a relationship with some higher-ranking officer and officers
below the President” and that “whether one is an inferior officer depends on
whether he has a superior.”131 The Court explained that if someone’s work is
supervised and directed at some level by others who were appointed by a
Presidential appointee that was confirmed through the advice and consent of
the Senate, then they are considered inferior officers.132 The court also found
it “significant” that the Court of Criminal Appeal Judges discussed in
Edmond had “no power to render a final decision [in their cases] unless
permitted to do so by other Executive officers.” 133
Later, in United States v. Arthrex, the Court reaffirmed and elaborated
the rule from Edmond, explaining that the Director of the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) who supervises and directs the work of
administrative patent judges (APJs) must have the “discretion” to review
their decisions. There, the Court addressed the appointment of APJs from the
PTO who Congress designated as inferior officers appointed by the Secretary
of Commerce.134 Because they are inferior officers, their appointment by the
Secretary of Commerce was constitutional, but the scope of their powers as
inferior officers was not because their decisions were insulated from review
by their director.135 The Court found this unconstitutional because the
President cannot oversee APJs himself “nor can he attribute the Board’s
failings to those whom he can oversee.”136 Thus, inferior officers must have
their work directed and supervised by a principal officer (appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate) and their decisions must
also be reviewable by a principal officer.137

131. Edmond, 520. U.S. at 653-54, 662, 666. In Edmond, the Court addressed whether the
Secretary of Transportation could constitutionally appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioners argued the judge who convicted them was unconstitutionally
appointed by the Secretary of Transportation because they were principal officers that must be
appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. The Court found the Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals judges were inferior officers and therefore their appointment by the
Secretary of Transportation was constitutional. Id.
132. Id. at 663.
133. Id. at 665; see also Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1981 (citing Edmond).
134. Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1980.
135. Id. at 1981.
136. Id. at 1982. Arthrex and Edmond both recognize the Appointments Clause as a
“significant structural safeguard” to preserve political accountability. Political accountability is
preserved “through direction and supervision” of subordinates. Id.
137. It is important to note that Arthrex does not require that all decisions be reviewed, only
that there be discretion to review them. Id. at 1988.

June 2022

IMMIGRATION JUDGE INDEPENDENCE UNDER ATTACK

195

c. Principal and Inferior Officers Are Appointed Through
Separate Procedures
The Appointments Clause provides the procedure for appointing both
principal and inferior officers.138 If someone is a principal officer, they must
be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.139
If someone is an inferior officer, they may be appointed either by the
President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments.140 In
Freytag, because the STJs were found to be inferior officers, their
appointment by the Chief Tax Judge was constitutional because it was
considered a Court of Law under the Appointments Clause. 141 Similarly, in
Edmond the Judge of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals was found
to be an inferior officer who was constitutionally appointed by the Secretary
of Transportation.142 In Lucia however, the Court found SEC ALJ
appointment offended the Appointments Clause, because as inferior officers
SEC ALJs could not be appointed by the commission’s staff.143
B. IJs are Constitutionally Appointed Inferior Officers
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10, IJs are “attorneys” appointed by the Attorney
General as administrative judges in the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge.144 IJs “conduct specified classes of proceedings, including hearings
under section 240 of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.”145 IJ
proceedings include: deportation, exclusion, removal, recission, and bond

138. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670.
139. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
140. Id.
141. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 890-92. There was a five-to-four split regarding whether the Tax
Court as an Article I court and could exercise the appointment power because it was a “Court of
Law” or because it was a “Head of Department” under the Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The majority found the Tax Court was not an executive department and thus the
Chief Tax Judge could not exercise the appointment power as a “Head of Department.” Freytag,
501 U.S. at 891. The Court explained that “Courts of Law” under the Appointments Clause does
not only include Article III courts because the judicial power of the United States can also be
exercised by Article I Courts. Id. at 889; American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 546 (1828)
(stating judicial power can be exercised by legislative courts); Williams v. U.S., 289 U.S. 553, 56567 (1933) (same). Thus, the Tax Court is considered a “Court of Law” for purposes of the
Appointments Clause. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891. The concurring opinion disagreed, noting that the
Tax Court was a department within the executive branch and the Chief Judge was its head. Id. at
901. (J. Scalia, concurring in part). See, Theodore B. Olson, Separation of Powers and the Supreme
Court: Implications and Possible Trends, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. UNIV. 266, 270 (1992) (discussing the
debate among the Court in Freytag).
142. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666.
143. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
144. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).
145. Id.
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hearings.146 In removal proceedings, IJs determine whether a non-citizen
should be allowed to enter the country or whether they should be removed.147
In doing so, IJs may consider various forms of relief, such as asylum,
cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, or voluntary departure.148 An
IJ’s powers and duties include exercising independent judgment and
discretion, administering oaths, receiving evidence, and interrogating and
cross examining non-citizens and witnesses.149 They may also issue
subpoenas for witnesses and evidence.150 An IJ’s decision is administratively
final unless it is appealed or certified to the board or review is requested by
the Attorney General.151
a.

IJs Exercise Significant Authority, Serve on an Ongoing
Basis, and Are Supervised by a Higher-level Official Who
Has the Discretion to Review Their Decisions

First, the Tax Court’s STJs in Freytag were found to exercise significant
authority during the course of their duties because they take testimony, rule
on the admissibility of evidence, have the power to issue final decisions in at
least some cases, and have the general power to enforce compliance with
discovery.152 In Lucia, the Court found that SEC ALJs exercise significant
authority because they also take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the
admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce discovery orders.153
The Lucia Court also stated that contempt power is not needed in order to
meet the requirement of enforcing compliance with discovery orders, because
only a general power to do this is needed.154

146. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (governing removal proceedings); see also Immigration
Judge Job Posting, EOIR (June 15, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigrationjudge-13 (stating immigration judges preside in “formal, quasi-judicial hearings” which require
them to “exercise independent judgement in reaching final decisions.”).
147. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States, or if
the alien has been admitted, removed from the United States.”); see also Functions Manual EOIR,
supra note 39.
148. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (providing the burden of proof the non-citizen must meet to
be granted relief); see also, Functions Manual EOIR, supra note 39.
149. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
150. Id.
151. Functions Manual EOIR, supra note 39; see also Marks, supra note 6, at 7 (stating in
fiscal year 2006, approximately 90% of IJ decisions became final orders); see also Hon. Mimi
Tsankov, supra note 60, at 3 (stating in 2021 94% of IJ decisions were final and unreviewed); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (Providing “the board shall refer to the attorney general for review
of its decision all cases that: the attorney general directs the board to refer to him.”).
152. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
153. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
154. See id. at 2054 (noting Freytag only requires a general power to enforce discovery
orders).
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In both Hurtado v. Barr and Ramirez v. Barr, the Ninth Circuit,
following the logic in Freytag, Lucia, and Edmond, concluded that IJs are
inferior officers who are constitutionally appointed by the Attorney General
of the United States.155 First, the court concluded IJs are officers rather than
employees because “they are adjudicative officials who exercise significant
authority.”156 Second, the court found that they are inferior rather than
principal officers because they are “subject to both judicial and managerial
supervision.”157 Third, the court noted that IJ appointments do not offend the
Appointments Clause because IJs are appointed by the Attorney General with
authority granted by Congress.158
Similar to the Tax Court’s STJs and the SEC’s ALJs in Freytag and
Lucia, respectively, IJs take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the
admissibility of evidence, and enforce discovery orders.159 However, IJs are
most similar to Lucia’s SEC ALJs, who have “less capacious power to
sanction misconduct,” while their STJ counterparts in Freytag could punish
contempt through fines and imprisonment.160 Presently, IJs do not have
contempt authority, even though it was mandated by Congress in 1996.161 But
as the majority noted in Lucia, all that is needed to exercise significant
authority is the general power to enforce discovery orders, and this task is not
limited in scope to holding parties in contempt.162 Thus, IJs exercise
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.163
Next, IJs are inferior rather than principal officers because they are
appointed to a continuing office; judgeships are not temporary as evidenced
by the distinction between “temporary IJs” and “IJs” in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a)
155. Hurtado, 817 Fed. App’x at 313 (unpublished opinion). Ramirez, 814 Fed. App’x at 264
(unpublished opinion).
156. Hurtado, 817 Fed. App’x at 313 (unpublished opinion) (citing Lucia and Freytag).
Ramirez, 814 Fed. App’x at 264 (unpublished opinion) (citing Lucia and Freytag).
157. Id. (citing Edmond to distinguish between inferior and principal officers).
158. Hurtado, 817 Fed. App’x at 313. Both Hurtado and Ramirez were decided prior to
Arthrex, but because IJ decisions are subject to review by the Attorney General, it is likely IJs would
have been found to act within the scope of permissible power for inferior officers.
159. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (providing IJ powers and duties); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)
(providing IJ authority in removal proceedings); see also Immigration Judge Job Posting, supra
note 146 (stating that immigration judges preside in “formal, quasi-judicial hearings” which require
them to “exercise independent judgement in reaching final decisions.”); see also Hurtado, 817 Fed.
App’x at 313 (finding IJs are inferior officers); see also Ramirez, 814 Fed. App’x at 264 (finding
IJs are inferior officers).
160. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054; see also Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891 (stating STJs have the
power to punish contempt through fines and imprisonment); see also Marks, supra note 6, at 10
(stating IJs do not have contempt authority).
161. See Marks, supra note 6, at 10. See also Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 6, at 3
(stating DHS has blocked the DOJ from promulgating regulations that would allow IJs to have
contempt power even though Congress gave IJs this authority over 20 years ago). Additionally, a
bill was recently introduced in the House of Representatives that would give IJs contempt authority.
See Empowering Immigration Courts Act, H.R. 1121, 117th Cong. (2021).
162. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054.
163. See id.
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and (e).164 And finally, IJs have a superior that was appointed by the
President.165 IJs are subject to supervision by the Attorney General of the
United States, who may review their decisions, and they act under the
Attorney General’s delegated authority.166 The Attorney General is the head
of the DOJ, a “Head of Department” under the Appointments Clause. 167
Therefore, because IJs are inferior officers, they are constitutionally
appointed by the Attorney General of the United States. 168
Although the current method of IJ appointment is constitutional, it
creates concerns regarding the real and perceived impartiality of IJs. IJs are
ultimately subordinate to “prosecuting officials” who appoint, supervise, and
rate their performance.169 This method of appointment implicates more than
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution; it implicates the Separation of
Powers principal because executive and judicial functions are combined
within an agency. This exposes impartial adjudication to law enforcement
priorities, pressure, and influence.170
C. Separation of Powers and the Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause is “more than a matter of etiquette or
protocol,”171 and must be seen as a “structural safeguard of the constitutional
scheme.”172 In drafting the Constitution, the framers knew that a separation
164. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a), (e) (making a distinction between IJs and “temporary
immigration judges” who serve in renewable terms that may not exceed six months). In January
2022, testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship, House Judiciary
Committee, explained because IJs do not have a fixed term of office, they can be removed at the
discretion of the Attorney General. This undermines public confidence in the impartiality and
independence of IJs. Grisez, supra note 4, at 2.
165. See 8 U.S.C. § 1003.10(a) (stating that immigration judges are administrative judges
appointed by the Attorney General); see also 28 U.S.C. § 503 (stating the Attorney General is
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate).
166. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (stating IJs “shall act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the
cases that come before them.”). See also 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(h)(1)(i) stating cases requested by the
Attorney General must be referred to them for review.
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 503 (stating Attorney General is the head of the DOJ); see also U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that inferior officers can be appointed by the Heads of
Departments); see also DOJ Organizational Chart, supra note 13 (providing a visual representation
of the DOJ structure with the Attorney General as the Head of the Department).
168. Hurtado, 817 F. App’x at 313; see also Jennifer L. Cotton, If Established by Law, Then
an Administrative Judge is an Officer, 53 GA. L. REV. 309, 331 (2018) (arguing that the test for
whether a non ALJ adjudicator is an officer should be whether their position is established by law).
There, the author notes that IJs are officers under the established by law test because their position
is established by law in 8 U.S.C § 1229a(a)(1). Id.
169. Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 172 (“it is straining at human nature to expect true
independence from the special inquiry officer [IJ] whose career and future advancement is still
completely in the hands of enforcement officials.”).
170. Id. at 175.
171. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660.
172. Id.
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of power among the three branches of government was essential and that the
legislative, executive, and judicial functions must be “separate and distinct”
from one another.173 The framers understood that if the power of judging
were joined with the legislative power, the judge would become the
legislature.174 Similarly, if the power of judging were joined with the
executive power, the judge would become law enforcement.175
The Appointments Clause serves a Separation of Powers function
because it vests the power to select principal officers exclusively in the
President, which prevents congressional encroachment in this task.176 This
keeps the selection of principal officers within the executive branch. Then
the Senate, or the legislative branch, is tasked with confirming those principal
officers chosen by the President.177 Inferior officers are appointed by a
different process only requiring the President alone, Courts of Law, or Heads
of Departments to appoint.178 The appointment of inferior officers can also
serve an important Separation of Powers function by keeping the functions

173. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120 (using Montesquieu’s “well known maxim” to discuss the
purpose of Separation of Powers within the United States Constitution). See also Black’s Law
Dictionary defining separation of powers as “the division of governmental authority into three
branches of government – legislative, executive, and judicial– each with specified duties on which
neither of the other branches can encroach.” Separation of Powers, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). Separation of Power is thought to protect “individual liberty by allocating particular
governmental powers to specific branches.” Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus in three dimensions
dimension III: Habeas Corpus as an instrument of Checks and Balances, 8 NE. UNIV. L.J. 251, 253
(2016). See also Anthony R. Enriquez, Structural Due Process in Immigration Detention, 21 CUNY
L. REV. 35, 37 (arguing that the current immigration court system which consolidates “jailer and
judge” within the executive branch offends due process requirements in immigration detention
cases).
174. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120.
175. Id. (quoting Montesquieu “[w]ere the power of judging … to be joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of the oppressor.”); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr.
& Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“the rule is that in the actual administration of the
government, Congress or the Legislature should exercise the legislative power, the President… the
executive… and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power.”).
176. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659.
177. Id. at 659-60. For the government to function effectively, the branches must also be
interdependent. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 160 (quoting Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, “while the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.”); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 160 (explaining that to appoint principal officers the
executive and legislative branch must work together). The Framers believed the President would be
less vulnerable to pressure and favoritism than would a “collective body,” but they also
acknowledged the dangers of leaving the appointment power unguarded. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660.
Thus, The Appointments Clause requires the executive and legislative branches to work together
when appointing principal officers. Id.
178. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (detailing the procedure
for appointing inferior officers).
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of the three branches separate by allowing agency judges, who are inferior
officers, to be appointed by “Courts of Law.” 179
The goal of the Separation of Powers principle was to protect against
“tyranny,” which today might be better understood as a guard against
unfairness.180 Yet administrative agencies do not follow the Separation of
Power principal because they combine government functions of the
legislative, judicial, and executive branches.181 The immigration court system
and the DOJ encompass both quasi-judicial roles and law enforcement
functions, creating overlap between the judicial and executive roles which
operate within the agency. The APA was passed to protect against the
unfairness that can result when governmental functions are combined.182
Despite this, Congress and the Supreme Court have said the APA does not
apply in deportation proceedings.183 Without these protections, the
appointment power becomes an increasingly important tool to maintain
Separation of Powers. IJs should be appointed by a neutral party, such as a
separate immigration court system, that can provide a constitutional
appointment scheme that is not controlled by a prosecutorial or law
enforcement body. To ensure impartial and independent adjudication, IJs
should be appointed by a Court of Law, similarly to the Tax Court’s STJs in
Freytag.184 For this to occur, an Article I Immigration Court, like the United
States Tax Court, should be created.

179. See Karen M. Sams, Out of the Hands of One: Toward Independence in Immigration
Adjudication, 5 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 85, 108 (2019) (“[b]ecause the [attorney general] is the
head of law enforcement officer tasked with implementing the policies of the President, the position
is inherently at odds with the responsibilities of an impartial [and] neutral arbitrator …”. See U.S.
CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2 (providing that for inferior officers Congress can vest the appointment power
in the President alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments).
180. Suzanne Antley, The “Appearance of Fairness” Versus “Actual Unfairness”: Which
Standard Should the Arkansas Courts Apply to Administrative Agencies?, 16 UNIV. OF ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 587, 592 (1994).
181. See id. at 606 (quoting Representative Oates during a congressional debate over the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Agency, “I believe it is absolutely unconstitutional and void,
because to my mind it is a blending of the legislative, the judicial, and perhaps the executive powers
of the government in the same law.”); see also Sams, supra note 179, at 107-8 (explaining
“[a]dministrative law is commonly adjudicated from within an agency precisely because the agency
head is a policymaker who can oversee adjudications and ensure that policies of the agency are
consistently applied.”).
182. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (“[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related
case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review. . .”); see also
Antley, supra note 180, at 607 (stating the APA was enacted to prevent unfairness in agency
adjudications); see also Sams, supra note 179, at 106 (stating without the protections of the APA
judicial independence is rendered optional).
183. Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, supra note 9 (establishing APA does not apply
to deportation proceedings); see also Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306 (establishing APA does not apply
to deportation proceedings).
184. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891.
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PART III: PROPOSED SOLUTION: ARTICLE I
COURT185
Creating a separate Article I Immigration Court is the best way to ensure
judicial independence and impartiality in immigration adjudication and
guarantee a method of appointment that conforms to both the Appointments
Clause and the Separation of Powers principal.186 The new immigration court
system should have two parts: an appellate level court187 and a trial level
court.188 This would allow the Immigration Court to follow an appointment
structure similar to the Tax Court with appellate level IJs being appointed by
the President with advice and consent of the Senate, just like the Tax Court’s
judges.189 IJs operating at the trial level could be appointed like the Tax
Court’s STJs are − by higher level judges.190

185. See Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners, U.S. IMMIGR. POL’Y AND THE NAT’L
INT. 248-50 (Mar. 1, 1981), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED211612.pdf (recommending that an
Article I Immigration Court be created). Legislation to establish an Article I immigration Court was
also introduced in the House of Representatives in the later 1990s. See United States Immigration
Court Act of 1999, H.R. 185, 106th Cong. (1999); United States Immigration Court Act of 1998,
H.R. 4107, 105th Cong. (1998); United States Immigration Court Act of 1996, H.R. 4258, 104th
Cong. (1996). More recently, advocates have also expressed support for an independent Article I
immigration Court. See Advocates Call on Congress to Establish an Independent Immigration
Court, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/ailacorrespondence/2020/advocates-call-on-congress-establish-independent
(signed
by
54
organizations). National Association of Immigration Judges Letter to Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren
(Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/2020.12.14.00.pdf (signed
by 125 organizations).
186. The United States Immigration Court should be modeled after the United States Tax
Court. This would ensure that an IJs functions are not combined with prosecutorial functions. Under
26 U.S.C § 7441, “the members of the Tax Court shall be the chief judge and the judges of the Tax
Court. The Tax Court is not an agency of and shall be independent of the Executive Branch of the
Government.” (emphasis added). See 26 U.S.C. § 7441. See also Marks, supra note 6, at 15
(recommending a separate Article I Immigration Court instead of an independent agency that would
keep the immigration court within the Executive Branch).
187. This would replace what is currently known as the BIA. See H.R. 4107, supra note 185
(proposing appellate level IJs be appointed by the President, by and with consent of the Senate).
188. See id. (proposing a separate immigration court system with an appellate division and
trial division).
189. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b) (“judges of the Tax Court shall be appointed by the President,
by and with advice and consent of the Senate). See also H.R. 4107, supra note 185 (proposing the
Chief Immigration Appeals Judge and other immigration appeals judges be appointed by the
President by and with advice and consent of the Senate.). See Stevens, supra note 99, at 8 (proposing
that appellate level IJs could be appointed by the President by and with advice and consent of the
Senate, and they in turn could appoint trial division judges).
190. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(A)(a) (providing the chief judge appoints STJs); see also H.R.
4107, supra note 185 (proposing the trial level chief immigration judge and other IJs be appointed
by the Chief Immigration Appeals Judge). This method of appointment was found to be
constitutional because STJs are inferior officers. Under the framework the Court has provided it is
likely that IJs would also be considered inferior officers. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (finding STJs
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Some may argue that because the current method of IJ appointment is
constitutional, there is no need to change it. This conclusion ignores the
purpose of the Appointments Clause. The Framers “embedded” the
Separation of Powers principle within the Appointments Clause to avoid the
commingling of functions of the legislative branch or the executive branch
with the functions of judging.191 Administrative agencies violate Separation
of Powers, which is why the APA was enacted, in part, to ensure fair and
impartial agency adjudication. Yet, the APA does not apply to insulate IJs
from prosecutorial control in deportation proceedings where the stakes are
high, and people can be separated from their families or sent back to their
country of origin to face persecution, torture, or death. But IJ appointment by
a Chief Appellate Immigration Judge within a separate Article I Immigration
Court can ensure that IJs are appointed by other judges, thereby limiting
prosecutorial control by way of appointment. 192 It would also conform to the
Separation of Powers principle because adjudicatory functions and control of
those functions would belong to higher level judges.
Those against a separate Immigration Court system might also argue
this method of appointment will not free IJs from political pressure or control.
But the goal should not be to limit all political pressure, but rather to insulate
IJs within a court system where they are not under prosecutorial control.193
Appointment under an Article I Court would allow the President to appoint a
Chief Appellate Immigration Judge who then in turn would appoint each
individual IJ.
An Article I Immigration Court has also been proposed by judges,
scholars, non-governmental agencies, and various bar and professional
associations to solve a myriad of other immigration court problems.194 This
are inferior officers); see also Hurtado, 817 Fed. App’x at 313 (finding IJs are inferior officers); see
also Ramirez, 814 F. App’x at 265 (finding IJs are inferior officers).
191. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 159.
192. As a principal officer appointed by the President who supervises and directs the conduct
of IJs, the Chief Appellate IJ should also have discretion to review IJ decisions as required by
Arthrex; see Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1988.
193. See Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 18 (1980) (“the jealously-guarded separation of functions principle makes for a
judicial tradition of independence that renders courts less likely than other agencies of government
to yield to political pressures.). See Stevens, supra note 99, at 8 (stating that an Article I Court
“would cure the perception that immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have
become so politicized that decisions are not based on the established law but on the changing views
of any particular administration.”).
194. AILA Policy Brief: Restoring Independence to America’s Immigration Courts, AM.
IMMIGRI. LAW. ASS’N (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-policy-briefs/ailacalls-for-independent-immigration-courts; see also Summary of Proposed “United States
Immigration Court Act” (as of 7-16-2019), FED. BAR ASS’N, https://www.fedbar.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/proposed-Article-I-immigration-ct-summary-of-model-bill-07162019pdf-1.pdf; see also Marks, supra note 6; see also Roberts, supra note 193; see also Peter J. Levinson,
A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME L. 644, 651-55; see
also Letter to Congress Must Establish an Independent Immigration Court (Feb. 18, 2020),

June 2022

IMMIGRATION JUDGE INDEPENDENCE UNDER ATTACK

203

new immigration court system could improve the credibility of the court, help
address issues of due process, and cure prosecutorial influences that do not
stem directly from the appointment process.195 It could also create uniformity
in immigration law, helping to ensure consistent outcomes in asylum cases.196
The methods of politicized hiring seen during the Bush administration would
be lessened because appointment of IJs would occur exclusively by higher
level judges, and not the Attorney General who favors the DOJ’s law
enforcement priorities.197

CONCLUSION
Removal hearings can have serious consequences, separating people
from their homes, jobs, spouses, and children.198 IJs who hear these cases
should not be appointed and supervised by prosecutors, but this is exactly
what occurs within our immigration court system today. This method of
appointment creates the perception, real or not, that immigration cases are
not adjudicated by impartial judges. The United States must consider the
interests of both its citizens and non-citizens in receiving fair and impartial
adjudication that is not undermined by prosecutorial control and create a
separate Article I immigration court with a new constitutional IJ appointment
scheme. The issues plaguing immigration courts—unmanageable caseloads,
inconsistent rulings, and partiality— have not improved but have instead
worsened. It is time we understand that the deficits of the immigration court
system cannot be cured by political motivations or arbitrary performance
evaluations. For these reasons, it is imperative that an Article I United States
Immigration Court be established, finally liberating IJs from appointment and
supervision by the Attorney General.

https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/ngo_letter_independent_immigration
_court.pdf.
195. See Marks, supra note 6, at 16. There, Judge Marks discusses how an Article I
Immigration Court would ensure due process, credibility in the court would be strengthened, and
structural issues could be cured so that the court is “outside the imposing shadow of DHS and law
enforcement priorities.” Id.
196. See Levinson, supra note 194, at 653.
197. See Featured issue: Immigration Courts, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/immigration-courts (suggesting Congress pass
legislation creating an Article I Court to help solve problems within the immigration court system,
including politicized hiring); see also Liptak, supra note 54.
198. Maslow, supra note 2, at 310 (describing deportation as “tearing” a non-citizen
“physically” from their home, job, spouse, and children).
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